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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DOUGLAS J. TUELLER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 930799-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of theft from a 
person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-6-404 & -412 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that no 
discovery violation had occurred which would justify the 
exclusion of Investigator Miller's testimony? A trial court's 
determination of what materials fall within the scope of a 
discovery request is a conclusion of law which is accorded no 
deference on appeal. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah 
App. 1993). However, the court's determination that disclosure 
was made is a question of fact which must be affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 
(Utah 1993). Whether a question of law or fact, "an error based 
on nondisclosure by the prosecution warrants reversal 'only if a 
review of the record persuades the [appellate] court that without 
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant.'" Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations 
omitted). Accord State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah 
1987). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion for new trial based on defendant's allegations that the 
prosecutor failed to disclose discovery materials and elicited 
false testimony? 
A denial of a motion for a new trial is "within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed 
absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 712 
P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules, in pertinent part, are 
determinative of this case: 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information 
of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements 
of the defendant or codefendant; 
(2) the criminal record of defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized rom the 
defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilty of the defendant, or mitigate the 
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown should be 
made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as 
2 
soon as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the 
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying 
the opposing party that material and information may be 
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable 
times and places. 
• • • 
(g) If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings its is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, 
the court may order such party to permit the discovery 
or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it 
may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24. Motion for 
new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a 
party or upon its own initiative, grant a new 
trial in the interest of justice if there is 
any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of 
a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in 
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be 
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential 
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is 
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court 
may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as 
it deems reasonable. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30. 
Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By amended information, defendant was charged with 
theft from a person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 & -412 (1990) (R. 6-7). Trial occurred on 
3 
April 12-14, 1993, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty as 
charged (R. 95-99, 124-25, 127). On May 21, 1993, the court 
sentenced defendant to the statutory term of imprisonment and 
maximum statutory fine. The court then stayed the sentence and 
placed defendant on probation for three years under specified 
terms and conditions (R. 130-31). 
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for new trial 
which was denied (R. 153-54, 169; Supp. Record, Order dated Nov. 
30, 1993). Defendant timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction 
At trial, defendant did not dispute that he stole 
concert tickets belonging to Krista Warberg but claimed that his 
criminal acts only supported a jury finding of misdemeanor theft 
and not felony theft from a person (T. 283-84). On appeal, 
defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his felony conviction. 
Instead, he alleges prosecutorial misconduct: the 
prosecutor failed to provide the defense with Investigator 
Miller's notes and tape of an interview with defense witness Matt 
Despain and failed to correct Miller's testimony that no such 
notes or tape existed. Defendant argues that this alleged 
misconduct entitles him to a new trial because but for 
Investigator Miller's testimony on rebuttal concerning the 
Despain interview, the outcome of his trial would have been more 
favorable. Since analysis of defendant's claim of prejudice 
4 
necessarily involves a review of the trial evidence, the 
f o] 1 owing statemenr of fact is ;i y-\ nuhm i. tt cnil , State v, Archuleta, 
85 0' P. 2d at 124 3; State v. Knight, 73 4 i\2d at 918 19, 
The recitation of facts is in the light most favorable 
I"-11 II" I'll1)'" •T-rdw I , State v . Hamilton,, H27 p,2d 232, 233-34 
(Utah 1992). 
Trial Testimony 
• Garth Hronks-i' concerts sell nut i|iiickly; fans must wait 
hours to purchase tickets (T 66-68) As d result, "scalpers" 
sometimes purchase tickets only to resell t:. hern for amounts 
substail 1; ia 1 Iy above I"ace < >ra"1 ue K"1 f*-A11\ upoiiSOTS a\\f empt to 
control scalping but, in Utah, i.f is not illegal I "', 2 7 °, 
announced tickets were available :•:..•• :^i Brooks concert 
scheduled for J une (T 63, 6 6 ) . Hopeful ticket purchasers 
descended on the event c 
Among the fans was Krista Warberg (id.) . Kri^: , :• • i -
friend's brother, Steve Moul*- • - agreed that • K n - v * vv-_-
wait in iin e ici t"te. ve , w 1 Ii> • 
ticket (T. 65-67), 
Krlsla act to the Delta Center around 
the day before . box office wai e 
waited all day. When night fell, her friend, Diane Moulton, 
j' :: :i ne> :i h sx and they c * »ed out ±n i *
 ;ie ticket office so 
as not to ] ose thei i ; . ^ ° n'n ^ 'rie .... ^e next day after 
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Krista had stood in line twenty-four hours, Steve relieved her. 
He eventually purchased several tickets for himself, his family 
including Diane, and the ticket for Krista (T. 67-68) . 
Not all fans were willing to stand in line for tickets. 
Bob Miller, defendant's Softball couch, asked defendant if he 
could use his insider-connections to get tickets (T. 154-55). 
Defendant knew some current employees of the Delta Center from 
his prior employment as a security guard at the Salt Palace (T. 
20-21, 155, 207). Defendant telephoned Laura Russell, a Delta 
Center administrative assistance, to see if she would put aside 
some tickets for him (T. 155, 207). Laura explained that while 
she had previously been able to get defendant tickets when she 
was employed at the Salt Palace, the Delta Center's policy 
prohibited employees from purchasing tickets either for 
themselves or others (T. 208, 210-11). Because of the 
restriction, Laura told defendant that she "couldn't get him any 
tickets" (T. idL, 209). 
Defendant did nothing further during the next days to 
obtain tickets (T. 156). 
June 6th arrived, the day of the Brooks' concert. 
Despite Laura Russell's previous explanation that Delta Center 
employees could not purchase tickets, defendant called another 
former Salt Palace employee, Bradford Freckleton, who was now the 
Delta security manager (T. 21-22) . Bradford recalled that 
defendant first called sometime before noon and 
indicated that, of course, the desire to go 
to the show, but had discussed with me 
6 
[Bradford] that he had made some prior 
arrangements to get tickets through a Laura 
Russell that worked in our ticket lobby. I 
indicated that, you know, I - - I was not 
aware of that, that I was going -- you know, 
I'd have to check with Laura, as far as what 
the?, tickets were, because I believe she was 
on vacatic 11 at the time. 
Defendant cal led Bradford back around l.wJ W-L ~.„~ ^ .z... 
frr
 23) Bradford told defendant ;. 
no one ii i the ticket lobby or ticket office 
had indicated that, you know, that Laura had 
done anything and that there was no tickets 
left. Again, I [Bradford] indicated that 
there was nothing that had been released1 up 
[sic] at that time. There was talk that 
there was going to be release of seats that 
was going to take place later that day, and I 
indicated that he was welcome to come up and 
stand in line with the other people that are 
getting tickets, but there was no way that I 
could actually pull our security tickets for 
him. 
jeu m m 
:•>:•?:?. defendant, who worked ^ ontinental Airlines, could 
- - ••-'- -^ — --':.'-• r iv^P' :- ' Bradford told him that he 
.;- getting i:-,u^-; u,e concert was scheduled for 7:30 
!"T ii'i) . According to defendant, his coach and the coach's 
- .i,.^ w e r e Wiiil ]i„ii«'i I if I h •" J HI iint. I c a ^ n r e d t ii R e t s ' " ln (,,,s*tba"M 
diamond where one oi their games was being played 
Defendant and his friend, Matt Despain, were suppose .. ... at the 
1
 For some events, tickets are held back from the initial 
public sale and then "released" for sale shortly before the event. 
Fans sti 11 must wait in line to purchase these released tickets 
(T. 48) 
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game (T. 122-23, 126). Instead, defendant told Despain that he 
had to drive to the Delta Center to "get some tickets" (T. 123). 
On the way, defendant asked if he could borrow some money since 
he had none with him; Despain agreed (T. 137, 179). 
Defendant and Despain arrived at the Delta Center 
around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. (T. 48-49, 60-61, 68, 101, 123, 190). 
Despain stayed in the car while defendant went inside (T. 123). 
At the ticket window, defendant told the saleswoman 
that he had tickets on will-call under his name; she searched but 
there were none (T. 45). Defendant then insisted that the 
tickets were under Brad Freckleton's name; again, there were none 
(id.). Defendant became "very agitated" and "irate," insisting 
that Brad had tickets for him (T. 46). The saleswoman suggested 
that he ask information to contact Brad, who was in charge of 
security that night (id.). Defendant did. When Brad received 
notice that defendant was in the lobby, he sent Chad Stapley to 
tell defendant that there were no available tickets and none, to 
his knowledge, being released (T. 23-24, 56). 
After Stapley told him Brad's message, defendant 
returned to the ticket window, now insisting that Laura Russell 
left him tickets (T. 47). Again, no tickets were found. An 
employee called Laura, who was home on vacation, and told her 
that defendant was insisting she had tickets for him; Laura said 
she did not (T. 208-09). Throughout the encounter, the 
saleswoman told defendant that the concert was sold out and 
suggested that defendant stand in another line to see if any 
8 
extra tickets would be released; defendan: ~vei :V d '" ) , 
Ins! eviri defendant ret urned :*x . ne tuia 
Despain that "he couldn't; get: ahold [sic J ot the guy he knew 
there H- - * • njLdn't get him on the ra< ^nd that he just 
i! 11,11 * re" 
While defendant was inside insisting that he had 
tickets i.HI lie !'/, Yi istci and JK.M friend Diane arrived rit 1. lie* D H 1 a 
Center but waited outside on a corner, hoping to meet some 
frit-- -- .,-• - , 
Kx ii 
knee surgery-
hand *u' - ' 
not f 
defendant *•"• 
about ti.. , , 




i*e oncert tickets .> h^~ 
- "
 ?
 > -t' umbers since she had 
Despai -: , \ *„:.<- t::^:, 
•"'- .T- -: pulled his rai to the curb 
'ei e stand i Jiq i i i < i.« • t i . 
Despain stayed i n the cai wi-;ir defendant walked over to 
Kiri st a ,2 
Defendant asked "Il«w inuch ai e y u wuiliny •, uin l irlkei 
for?" (T. 72) 
Krista replied: "The- - i Defendant 
again asked h^™ mnr' 
2
 Defendant and Despain claimed that the reason defendant 
approached Krista was that it appeared that she was waving the 
tickets as if to scalp them,. IT 1 24, 161, 165) . Krista and Diane 
denied this and denied that Krista in any fashion offered to se"n 
the tickets (T. 72-73, 102-03, 105-06, 241-42, 246-47, 254). 
for sale." (T. 73). 
Defendant offered $50 for the tickets. Krista said: 
"No." (T. 73). 
Krista testified that defendant 
said that he was with either security or he 
was a cop, and that what we were doing was 
illegal, and if we didn't sell him the 
tickets for $50, we would leave there in 
handcuffs or $50, with $50." 
T. 74). Defendant then "showed us a badge and did --he put it 
away" (id.). 
Krista did not know what to say (T. 75). Diane replied 
that they were not selling tickets but just standing there to 
meet friends (T. 75, 243). When defendant continued to assert 
that he would take them to Delta security, Diane said, "Let's go" 
(id.). Krista asked to see defendant's badge again; he quickly 
took it out but immediately put it back in his pocket (T. 75-76). 
Krista had the tickets in her left hand and her cane in 
her right (T. 76). Defendant grabbed the tickets and walked 
quickly to his car (T. 77-78, 244-45). Krista and Diane were 
again stunned; they yelled and went after him (id.). Defendant 
got in on the driver's side; Despain was in the passenger seat 
(T. 81, 127, 168, 245). Krista stood in front of the car with 
her hand held out and yelled "stop" (T. 79-80). Diane was 
pounding on Despain's window (T. 245). Despain asked defendant 
what the problem was. Defendant responded that he "asked them 
how much for the tickets and they said $50, and he said that he 
gave them $50 and took the tickets, and she [Krista] said no, $50 
10 
apitfH, «1111J [civi eridtiiil, J .'-unl IK W I n't LJMIHJ t <"' pny h m !:L"n . 
apiece 'cause they was Isic) only $"17 tickets 01 something, and 
he walked away" 
I mo VI -1'1 ba ak a f ew ;i nches 
'"" ?' : .<-.-.• "j-v-ei rav-^ i : : •-• *. - side; Krista remained in 
front (id. Defendant ' . <- wheels sharply to the left and 
drove of . gh 1 «-i11ci fl A/ I ;:; t ed Kr i, s t a ' s 
knee brace, knocking ;,.= r nv. two IT, 81-83, 2 4 6 ) . 
Diane r - * - '< ' ~ ¥,{ "• "~ ^ — ^ -
 Vedi more slowly behind 
he r - i de 111' I' i.'"11ad S t ap1 e ^ ", 
-c«.!;*; - 'fice. Brad Freckleton had sent to the lobby to 
* ncLcLiiL ickets were available ("J" 53-55) . Police 
, , - „ .^  w ^ r ^ <"\. . * ayd i.u relat ed what 
happened and provided the license number of defendant's car (T. 
8 3 86, 24 6) . 
Meanwhilei( defendant and Despam drove lo the soltbali 
game, getting there around 7:30 p.m. when t lie game was half over 
) Defendant cl aimed that he gave Krista's 
tickets to his coach's daughter who gave them t her parents who 
were waiting i n thei r car (T,: 2 6 9 ) . W h e n D e l t a :•--• u r i t y c h e c k e d 
te:i : , tl ley fom i:i id x IC » i the seats I 
Defendant was subsequently interviewed by Detecti ve 
Kent Bigelow Defendant admitted that he was at 
he had called Brad Freckleton, who said that 
he had tickets for him for the Garth Brooks 
concert. And he went to get them, could not 
locate Mr. Freckleton, fel t Id ke that he was 
being jacked around, and left- And saw two 
girls standing with one girl holding tickets 
in her hand, she had a cane in one hand and 
tickets--holding tickets in her hand, and he 
said he went up and asked her how much they 
were, she said, $50. . . . And he took the 
tickets, gave her a $50 bill, took the 
tickets, and she says, no, that's $50 apiece. 
(T. 226-27). 
Other facts will be presented in the body of this brief 
as relevant to specific arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's arguments on appeal are founded on a fact 
never established in the trial court: Investigator Miller took 
notes and tape recorded his interview with Matt Despain. Since 
the trial court never found that such notes or tape recording 
existed, it necessarily concluded that no discovery violation had 
occurred which justified defendant's mid-trial request to exclude 
Miller's testimony or his post-conviction request for new trial. 
Defendant has not established that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying him the requested relief or that he 
suffered any prejudice by the- denial. 
The lack of a factual predicate for defendant's 
arguments is especially egregious due to the serious nature of 
his allegations. Defendant charges that Investigator Miller 
necessarily lied when he said no tape recording was made, and 
accuses the prosecutor of suborning perjury by allowing Miller to 
testify that no tape existed. He makes these allegations despite 
his counsel's statements during closing argument that no tape 
existed and the prosecutor committed no improprieties. 
12 
Additional!-, defendant mischaracterizes the record. 
Throughout h :i s a/ppc .: )i: :i ef, def endai it a:i : g i ites that: the tri al 
court erred in denying :r. 3 motion,, for mi sti iaJ In fact, hi s 
counsel never requested a mistrial, continuance or other similar 
remedial meas 1 ' :L,ioj;i I'lii-l' ,i •  • J" ••  »' i l . 
ur;iq tri>]. defense counse. asserted that x*r he had not 
received what he characterized ^ v inculpatory report 
^ T ' s intervi ev c f def ei ise wi tness Despa i 1 1,, Mi ] 1 er t 
precluded from, testifying on rebuttal. The trial court properly 
pp'nrn i t led the testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
THERE WAS NO BASIS TO JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSION 
OF INVESTIGATOR MILLER'S TESTIMONY 
A. Defendant's assumption that Investigator Miller 
tape recorded and took notes of the Despain 
interview is without adequate record support. 
Matt Despain was not, charged or i nvestigated as d co-
defendant to defendant's ei i me; he was merely a witness. 
defendant was done 
Ice::"1 "! av enforcement under \ ;,. direct- ; ..; _c~:. . .jnty 
A\r 'r<r\ : Office \ •*:.: "TT.mdtr-d :. ,. j:;e ? 
charged 
1 September , 1 -.- defendant movea recuse the * , 
Lake County Attorney's Office due conflict, and sometime 
latei : , tiJ:: ,,,€ Utal :i Att ::  1 1 i:ie;y Genera 
prosecution (R; 1 9, 2:4-26') A preliminary hearing was scheduled 
.-. ••:. -• 1 , 3 
for October 22, 1992 (R. 19). 
Matt Despain, defendant's friend of 20 years, as well 
as Krista Warberg and Diane Moulton, had previously been 
interviewed during the investigation and those investigative 
reports had been supplied to defense counsel (T. 128, 132, 196, 
227-229). To prepare for the preliminary hearing, the newly 
assigned state prosecutor wanted to interview Despain in person 
(T. 103, 202-03) . He asked Investigator Miller to accompany him 
(id*). 
The interview took place the day before the preliminary 
hearing at Despain's home (T. 129, 212-13). Investigator Miller 
always takes a tape recorder to interviews but does not 
necessarily record all interviews3 (T. 219, 222). Although the 
tape recorder was observable on the table, Miller testified that 
he never turned it on and there was no discussion about taping 
the interview (T. 220-21). See also R. 151 (attached as Addendum 
E). Miller questioned Despain while the prosector took notes for 
his preliminary hearing preparation (T. 216). 
Despain was subpoenaed but not called by either party 
during the preliminary hearing (T. 197). 
At trial, Despain was subpoenaed by the State but 
testified for the defense - but as defense counsel stated, no 
3
 Miller testified that he determines whether to record an 
interview depending on its nature, e.g. investigative, accusatory 
etc. (T. 219). Miller described this interview as non-
investigative and non-accusatory: he was only there so the 
prosecutor could pre-try a witness (T. 213, 219) . See also T. 
202-03. 
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matter who subpoenaed Despain, he was always a defense witness 
(T. 197, 203). Prior to trial, the defense knew that Miller had 
interviewed Despain (T. 203). The only dispute is when defense 
counsel learned that Miller might testify: the prosecutor 
maintained that he told counsel prior to trial; defense counsel 
stated that he learned the first day of trial (T. 197, 203). 
When Despain testified, he described what he observed 
concerning defendant's encounter with Krista Warberg. Despain 
said he remained in the car, about 30 feet away, facing away from 
the location of defendant and Krista (T. 126, 138-39). He was 
anxious "to get going" as they were late for the softball game; 
he kept looking at the car clock and "cussing" (T. 127, 139). 
Despain testified: 
Well, I didn't pay a lot of attention [to the 
encounter], but [defendant] went over and 
talked to [Krista and Diane] for quite 
awhile, and I looked over once--I looked over 
several times, but at one point, it appeared 
[Krista] had hand--she was handing him the 
tickets. I didn't actually see the tickets 
exchange their hands, but [defendant] was 
pulling his hand back, [Krista] was pulling 
her hand back, and he had the tickets in his 
hand. She had money in her left hand, he had 
the tickets in his hand, and they were 
standing there, talking. They talked again 
for--the whole exchange probably took ten, 15 
minutes. And he stood there and talked to 
them for quite awhile, I kept thinking, come 
on, let's go. 
(T. 126). Despain's testimony that he saw Krista holding money 
and defendant holding the tickets corroborated defendant's 
version of the theft but was in direct conflict with Krista's and 
Diane's testimony that no money was exchanged, defendant just 
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grabbed the tickets from Krista's hands. This information was 
reflected in the various investigative reports provided to the 
defense, and was not the subject of Miller's rebuttal testimony. 
What was disputed was Despain's further testimony 
concerning what he told Investigator Miller about lending the 
money to defendant. During initial direct examination, Despain 
testified that he had discussed the incident with several people, 
including insurance investigators and police officers (T. 128). 
The exchange continued: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you also had a 
conversation with [the prosecutor], isn't 
that true? 
DESPAIN: That's correct. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: He had an investigator with 
him? 
DESPAIN: Ron Miller. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What, if anything, did he 
say to you? 
DESPAIN: He asked me if I'd come to Court, I 
hadn't been subpoenaed, I told him I'd rather 
not, I've got work to do. I don't like doing 
this kind of stuff," it costs me a lot of 
money. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We>ll, he -- that was your 
conversation? You--
DESPAIN: Yeah, that's what I was saying, I 
was saying it to both of them. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: --were telling them you 
didn't want to come? 
DESPAIN: They're both --
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And--
DESPAIN: --asking me questions and recording 
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it and I'm not sure exactly which one asked 
me which question, but you know. 
(T. 128-30). Defense counsel asked no other questions concerning 
the alleged tape recording or note-taking. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Despain 
on the details of the loan: 
PROSECUTOR: Now, you--on the way there, let's 
back up a little bit, you gave money to the 
defendant, didn't you? 
DESPAIN: That's correct. 
PROSECUTOR: And that was some tens and 
twenties, or twenties and tens? 
DESPAIN: I don't remember the denomination. 
PROSECUTOR: It wasn't a $50 bill, was it? 
DESPAIN: I don't remember the denomination. 
Could have been. 
PROSECUTOR: Do you recall telling Ron Miller 
that you were certain it wasn't a $50 bill? 
DESPAIN: No, I don't recall telling him that. 
I recall telling him I didn't remember what 
the denominations were. 
(T. 137-38) . 
On rebuttal, Investigator Miller testified that while 
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the prosecutor took notes, Miller did not4 (T. 213, 216, 218-19, 
221-22). His recollection was that Despain said he had given 
defendant $50 in tens and twenties, but not a $50 bill as 
defendant claimed5 (T. 215-16). 
During closing argument, defense counsel extensively 
discussed the lack of notes and tape recording. Defense counsel 
argued that Miller had deliberately not recorded Despain's 
interview and had failed to take notes so that Miller could 
testify without contradiction to its contents (T. 286-87). While 
4
 Defendant claims that Miller testified that he had written 
down Despain's statements concerning the denomination of the loan 
(Br. of App. at 10, referring to T. 222) . The statement, however, 
appears to be either a misstatement or inaccurately recorded when 
viewed in context. 
Miller repeatedly testified that he took no notes of 
Despain's responses; he merely doodled on a pad while asking 
questions (T. 213, 216, 218-19, 221-22) . Miller did not view 
himself as the investigator in the case, but was present as a 
safeguard for the prosecutor (T. 213). Miller's affidavit 
submitted in opposition to defendant's motion for new trial also 
states that no notes were made by Miller (R. 151). See Addenda C 
& E for testimony and affidavit. 
Miller was asked on cross-examination if he was testifying 
from his memory as to Despain's comments. Miller said "yes" (T. 
221-22) . He was then asked if he thought the denomination 
information was written down, "anywhere"; Miller responded that he 
believed it was and continued, "it has been written down by me" (T. 
222) . Since this is contrary ^to his testimony before and after the 
statement and his subsequent affidavit, it is reasonable to assume 
that Miller's response was actually that he believed it was written 
down by someone (the prosecutor) , but it was not written down by 
him. This interpretation is consistent with defense counsel's 
statements during closing argument that Miller deliberately never 
made any notes of the interview (T. 286-87). 
5
 Defendant claims that the only potential disagreement 
between Despain and defendant concerning the loan was its 
denomination (Br. of App. at 18) . This is incorrect: they also 
differed on the amount. Despain said defendant borrowed $50 (T. 
137-38, 215-16). Defendant, on the other hand, asserted that 
Despain gave him $60, a $50 bill and a $10 bill (T. 170, 179). 
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deriding Miller, defense counsel never implied that Miller had 
actually memorialized the interview but was now lying as to its 
existence (id.). Most significantly, defense counsel also took 
time to explain that while he and the prosecutor had disagreed 
during the trial, the prosecutor had never done anything 
"inappropriate" (T. 292). 
Despite this factual stance during trial, defendant 
argues a entirely different scenario post-conviction. Following 
sentencing, defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he 
alleged that Miller had taped the interview and taken notes, had 
lied under oath about their existence, and the prosecutor had 
knowingly elicited this alleged false testimony (R. 153-54) (a 
copy is attached in Addendum D). In support of his motion, 
defendant attached identical affidavits from Matt Despain and his 
wife which merely reiterated Despain's trial testimony that the 
20 minute interview was recorded and notes taken (R. 132-35) 
(attached in Addendum D). The State responded, again denying 
that Miller had a tape recording or notes of the session (R. 148-
52) (attached in Addendum E). Defendant did not request an 
evidentiary hearing and the motion was denied (Supp. Record, 
Order dated Nov. 30, 1993) (attached in Addendum F). 
The trial court never found that Miller had tape 
recorded or taken notes of the Despain interview. Defendant's 
assumption that such documents exist is without adequate record 
support. 
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B. Defendant failed to establish a basis to 
exclude Investigator Miller's rebuttal 
testimony. 
Defendant did not claim that the prosecutor had failed 
to comply with all discovery requests until after both parties 
had rested and the State was preparing to present its rebuttal 
evidence (T. 194-96) . 
Prior to trial, the State had provided the defense with 
a list of witnesses it anticipated presenting in direct rebuttal 
to defendant's expected testimony. The list included Laura 
Russell (whose name defendant gave at the ticket window as 
holding tickets for him), Detective Kent Bigelow (who as the 
investigating officer interviewed defendant prior to charges 
being filed), and Diane Moulton (Krista's friend who observed the 
encounter) (id.). The list did not include Investigator Miller6 
(T. 196, 203) . 
6
 While defendant on appeal periodically complains that the 
prosecutor failed to include Miller in the list of rebuttal 
witnesses, this was not argued below. At trial, defense counsel 
referenced Miller's absence from the state's formal list of 
witnesses but admitted that he had notice by the first day of trial 
that Miller might testify (T. 196-98). Defendant's argument to the 
trial court was not that Miller's appearance as a witness was a 
surprise but that because Miller "was a potential witness, that the 
State should have provided discovery to me, they should have 
provided a copy of the--the taped interview, if there was one, or 
they should have provided copies of--of summary reports that--that 
Mr. Miller may have prepared in preparation for this case or in 
preparation for his eventual . . . testimony" (T. 198). 
The prosecutor maintained that prior to trial, he had 
disclosed Miller's potential witness status in response to his 
learning that Despain would testify (T. 203). 
In light of defendant's trial statement that he knew that 
Miller might testify and his failure to allege that the timing of 
the disclosure prejudiced the defense in anyway, this issue is 
waived for purposes of appeal. State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 
922 (Utah App. 1991). 
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After the parties had rested and counsel were in-
chambers discussing the State's rebuttal witnesses which now 
included Investigator Miller, defense counsel referred to 
Despain's trial testimony that his pre-preliminary hearing 
interview was "recorded" (T. 194-97). However, even at this 
stage (prior to Miller testifying), defense counsel recognized 
that "there's a dispute about that at this point" (T. 196). 
Defense counsel asserted that because Miller was a 
rebuttal witness, the defense was entitled to any summaries 
Miller made (T. 198). When queried by the court as to 
defendant's authority that the prosecutor was obligated to 
provide reports of all witness interviews and reports (including 
defense and rebuttal witnesses), defense counsel initially 
referred to exculpatory discovery cases (T. 198-99). The court 
further questioned defense counsel, opining that no such broad 
request was made in defendant's motion for discovery (T. 199-
201). See Defendant's Motion for Discovery, attached in Addendum 
D. Defense counsel then abandoned the exculpatory evidence 
classification and characterized Miller's alleged tape and notes 
of the Despain interview information as inculpatory investigative 
evidence7 (T. 200-01). 
The prosecutor responded by explaining the pretrial 
non-investigative nature of the interview. More importantly, the 
prosecutor stated that while he took notes, Miller did not nor 
7
 Defendant maintains this latter position on appeal (Br. of 
App. at 17-21). 
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did he record the interview (T. 202). The prosecutor related 
that he had not turned over his notes as he viewed them as work-
product8 (T. 202-03) . Since Miller had no notes or tapes, the 
prosecutor had no memorization of the interview to disclose but 
asserted that he had previously told defense counsel that the 
interview occurred (id.). The prosecutor also explained that 
Despain had been subpoenaed by the parties several times before 
but never testified. When the prosecutor learned during trial 
that Despain was really going to testify, the prosecutor told 
counsel there was a possibility that Miller would be rebuttal 
witness (T. 203-04) . 
The court denied defendant's motion to exclude Miller's 
testimony (T. 204) . Defendant asked for no other remedial 
measures. 
1. Disclosure. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, prescribes 
what materials a prosecutor must disclose upon request. (The 
rule is reproduced at pages 2-3 of this brief). In response to a 
rule 16 discovery request, a prosecutor "either must produce all 
of the material requested or must identify explicitly those 
portions of the request which respect to which no responsive 
material will be provided. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 916-
917 (Utah 1987). Further, "when the prosecution agrees to 
8
 Below, defendant never requested that the prosecutor turn 
over his personal notes nor challenge the characterization of these 
notes as work-product (T. 202-04). On appeal, no issue is raised 
concerning the prosecutor's notes. 
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produce any of the material requested, it must continue to 
disclose such material on an ongoing basis to the defense." Id. 
at 917. 
On the other hand, rule 16 does not require a 
prosecutor to disclose unrequested information concerning its 
case.9 State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) (relying 
on State v. Fierst. 692 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1984)). Nor does a 
request for a list of prosecution witnesses require a prosecutor 
to "disclose a rebuttal witness whose need could not reasonably 
have been anticipated" prior to trial. State v. Tennyson, 850 
P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 1993). 
Analysis of a claim of improper non-disclosure must 
begin with the defendant's motion to discover. Knight, 734 P.2d 
at 916. A trial court's determination of the scope of a 
discovery request is a question of law and accorded no deference 
on appeal. Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 472. But the court's 
determination that a prosecutor has disclosed requested materials 
is a question of fact which must be affirmed on appeal absent 
clear error. See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah 
1993) . 
Here, the trial court initially questioned whether the 
alleged recording/notes of Despain's interview fell within 
9
 However, "due process requires a prosecutor to disclose even 
unrequested information which is or may be exculpatory." Carter, 
707 P.2d at 662 (citing State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 
1980)). Defendant does not claim that the information allegedly 
withheld is exculpatory; just the opposite, he characterizes 
Miller's interview as inculpatory impeachment. See fn. 7, infra. 
23 
defendant's discovery request (T. 198-99). The court did not 
believe that defendant had requested "any investigative reports" 
(T. 200-01). In fact, defendant had requested "all police 
reports and investigations" (R. 22) (Addendum A). The prosecutor 
responded that the interview was done post-investigation and 
solely for pre-trial purposes (T. 202-03). The prosecutor 
explained that there were no tape recordings or written summaries 
of the interview other than his own pretrial notes (id.). 
Further, when he found out that Despain would be testifying, he 
provided notice that Miller might testify in rebuttal (T.203). 
The court then ruled: 
I don't think Rule 16 requires it unless the 
cases to which [defense counsel] has 
reference do, I don't think they do, but 
whether I'm right or wrong, I guess the whole 
reason for the brouhaha is that you want his 
testimony excluded, and it will not be. 
(T. 204). Implicit in the court's ruling is its finding that the 
prosecutor properly complied with discovery. What is unclear is 
whether the court concluded that the disputed materials, even if 
they existed, did not fall within the scope of requested 
discovery (a conclusion of law), or whether it found that the 
prosecutor had complied with discovery by disclosing all 
requested existing materials (a factual finding). While the 
basis of the court's mid-trial ruling is unclear, the court post-
trial implicitly found that Miller's testimony was truthful when 
it denied defendant's motion for new trial. This will be more 
fully discussed in Point II of this brief. 
But defendant does not attack the lack of specificity 
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of the mid-trial ruling. Instead, defendant's argues that 
whatever the basis for the ruling, the State's failure to provide 
Miller's alleged tape recording and notes of the Despain 
interview 'mislead the defense into believing that no evidence 
from the October 17 interview existed and thus built Tueller's 
defense around the mistaken belief" (Br. of App. at 16). 
For the misleading-the-defense rationale to apply, a 
defendant must establish that his discovery request was 
sufficiently specific to permit the 
prosecution to understand what is sought and 
to justify the parallel assumption on the 
part of the defense that material not 
produced does not exist. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (emphasis added). Even without a clear 
trial court determination of the first prong, defendant's 
argument entirely fails the second. 
Defendant, in essence, argues that the State mislead 
him because he believed that Despain could testify without 
contradiction to his interview with Investigator Miller and the 
prosecutor. But whether or not Miller tape recorded the 
interview or took notes has no bearing on his ability to 
independently testify about the interview. Prior to trial, the 
defense knew the interview had occurred and defendant admits that 
at least by the first day of trial, he knew Miller might testify. 
Under these circumstances, defendant's argument is 
convoluted. The State's failure to provide documentation of the 
interview should have conveyed only one thing to defendant: 
Miller did not tape or summarize the interview. This was exactly 
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the State's position at trial. For the misleading-the-defense 
rationale to apply, the opposite would have had to occur. 
Miller's documentation would have had to exist but not been 
turned over, and the State would have had to then surprise the 
defendant with the documentation at trial. Id. 
Further, defendant's assertion that his defense was 
built around the mistaken belief that there was no documentation 
of the Despain interview belies the facts. Defendant's defense 
was not dictated by Despain's pretrial statements; it was defined 
by defendant's pretrial admissions to the police and his trial 
testimony. 
2. Prejudice. 
Even when a discovery violation occurs, the trial court 
has the prerogative of determining what remedy, if any, is 
necessary. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g). A trial court's denial of 
relief is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion; reversal is 
only warranted "when taking into account any remedial measures 
ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to the defendant still 
satisfies the standard for reversible error set forth in Rule 30 
[Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure], and the remedial measures 
requested but refused would have obviated this prejudice." 
Kniaht, 734 P.2d at 918. "Because of the difficulties posed by 
the record's silence in cases involving a wrongful failure to 
disclose inculpatory evidence," once a defendant makes "a 
credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the 
defense, it is up to the State to persuade [the appellate] court 
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that there is not reasonable likelihood that absent the error, 
the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable for the 
defendant." Id. at 921. Accord Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1243. 
In the instant case, defendant has failed to make a 
credible argument that the alleged non-disclosure impaired his 
defense. Defendant obviously needed Despain to testify no matter 
what Miller would say in rebuttal. He had no other witness to 
the encounter. Despain's value was not in corroborating the 
denomination of the money defendant claimed he gave to Krista, 
but in his willingness to corroborate that defendant gave any 
money in exchange for the tickets. 
Defendant also does not address how documentation of 
the interview, if it had existed, would have affected the outcome 
of his trial. State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 276 (Utah 1985) 
(defendant must establish the materiality of non-disclosed 
evidence). Documentation of the interview could only have 
changed the outcome of the trial if it was exculpatory --a claim 
defendant does not make and cannot prove.10 But it must be 
assumed that Despain's testimony would not have changed just 
because Miller had inculpatory notes or a tape recording of their 
interview. Certainly, defendant's testimony could not; he was 
locked in by his pretrial police interview in which he asserted 
10
 During trial, Despain testified that he could not now recall 
the denominations of the money he gave defendant and thought that 
was what he told Miller in the pretrial interview (T. 137-38) . His 
post-trial affidavit does not challenge Miller's subsequent 
testimony that Despain told him that the money was in tens and 
twenties (R. 132) (Addendum D). 
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that he gave Krista a single $50 bill (T. 227). Thus, if 
documentation of the Despain interviewed had existed and had been 
provided during discovery, the defense would have known that 
Despain could not back up defendant's version of the 
denominations of the loan, but would corroborate much of 
defendant's other testimony. If the defense had chosen not to 
call either Despain or defendant because of this relatively minor 
difference in their testimonies, the defense would have been 
weakened, not made stronger. 
Most importantly, defendant below never alleged that he 
was prejudiced by the claimed non-disclosure or Miller's 
potential testimony (T. 196-204). He had police reports of other 
interviews with Despain, knew of the Miller interview, and had 
presumptively briefed his witness prior to trial. Even if 
defendant did not know until trial of Despain's claim that the 
interview was tape recorded, he should have assumed that either 
Miller or the prosecutor may have taken notes. Yet, defendant 
never sought to compel discovery prior to trial. Further, 
defendant admits that by the first day of trial, he knew that 
Miller would testify, yet he Waited until the second day, after 
the parties had initially rested, before seeking a remedy. If 
defendant, as he now claims, truly needed more time to gather 
information, he was obligated to seek a trial continuance or 
recess. Even more indicative of defendant's lack of diligence is 
his failure to move for disclosure of the prosecutor's notes when 
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he was told that such notes existed.11 Instead, defendant sat 
back until mid-trial and then only sought to exclude Miller's 
testimony.12 State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant's failure to ask for a continuance which would have 
mitigated a discovery violation constituted waiver of his right 
to claim error on appeal); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 882-
83 (Utah 1988) (defendant waived relief by failing to make timely 
efforts to mitigate prejudice caused by discovery violation); 
State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) ("defendant's 
failure to exercise reasonable diligence in conducting trial 
discovery bears directly upon his claim of surprise"); State v. 
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980) (supreme court is 
"unwilling to adopt a rule that permits defense counsel, by 
withholding a request for available evidence, to in effect 
corrupt a trial and thereby obtain a retrial"). Compare Salt 
Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993) (waiver 
for failure to compel discovery does not apply when the 
prosecutor's silence mislead the defense to believe that no 
criminal record existed when in fact it did). 
Despite his failure; to argue prejudice below, defendant 
advocates prejudice on appeal. But he does so without regard to 
11
 While the prosecutor stated that he did not turn over his 
personal notes because he believed they fell in the work-product 
exception, defendant never asked the trial court to rule on the 
matter (T. 202-204). 
12
 Contrary to defendant's assertions, he never moved for a 
mistrial. The only remedy requested at trial was the exclusion of 
Miller's rebuttal testimony (T. 196-204). Post-conviction, 
defendant moved for a new trial (R. 153-54). 
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the trial arguments and evidence. Despain's veracity was not 
questioned at trial - only his ability to observe and recall. 
The prosecutor never questioned that Despain had given money to 
defendant, only defendant's assertion that he gave money to 
Krista. In fact, the prosecutor vouched for Despain's good 
character during his closing argument (T. 278, 295). 
The jury's assessment of defendant's lack of 
credibility did not turn on whether he gave Krista a single $50 
bill or tens and twenties. The jury never believed any money was 
given. They were told that if they believed that Krista had 
voluntarily given the tickets to defendant in exchange for $50 
but then upped the price (defendant's version of the encounter), 
defendant was only guilty of misdemeanor theft (T. 283-85, 289-
90). However, if they believed Krista's and Diane's testimony 
that defendant intimidated them by claiming he was a police 
officer and then forcibly grabbed the tickets, they should find 
defendant guilty of felony theft from a person (T. 293) . They 
returned the felony verdict. 
Even though the jury needed to assess defendant's and 
Krista's credibility, they had many witnesses' accounts to aid 
their deliberations. One was Despain; but he was too far away to 
hear any of the exchange and only occasionally observed it (T. 
126-28, 138-40). Diane Moulton, on the other hand, could fully 
observe defendant and Krista, as well as hear the conversation 
(T. 241-47). The jury also had the testimony of various Delta 
Center employees who related the events leading up to defendant's 
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encounter with Krista, and Detective Bigelow's account of his 
subsequent questioning of defendant. In each case, defendant's 
testimony substantially differed from the witness' statements. 
Compare T. 22-25 with T. 157-59, 173, 175, 189; T. 44-51 with T. 
160-61, 172-73, 182-83; T. 207-09 with T. 155-56; T. 226-27, 236-
37 with T. 174, 189. 
Any discrepancy in the testimony concerning the 
denominations of the loan is minor when viewed in light of the 
totality of the evidence introduced at trial. As such, there is 
no basis to conclude that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different if Investigator Miller had been precluded from 
testifying. State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989) 
(where defendant is not surprised, mislead, or otherwise 
prejudiced, any discovery violation is harmless); Schreuder, 712 
P.2d at 276 (discovery violation harmless). But see Knight, 734 
P.2d at 922 (discovery violation consisted reversible error). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEPENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY SUBSTANTIAL ERROR 
AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF HIS CASE 
At trial, defendant neither characterized Miller's 
testimony as false nor asserted prosecutorial misconduct for 
presenting that testimony (T. 196-204). Despite this, defendant 
asserted post-conviction in a motion for new trial: 
(1) the State had failed to provide Ron 
Miller's tape and notes of his interview with 
Matt Despain; and, 
(2) the State knowingly allowed Miller to 
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falsely testify that he had not recorded or 
taken notes of the interview. 
(R. 153-54)• Defendant attached two identical affidavits in 
support, one from Despain and one from his wife: both asserted 
that "they" (the prosecutor and Miller) asked to record the 
interview, had recorded the interview, and had taken notes (R. 
132, 134). Defendant did not claim that this information 
constituted "new evidence" but asserted that the "interest of 
justice" required a new trial based on these errors (R. 153) 
(copies of the motion and affidavits are attached in Addendum D). 
In response, the prosecutor submitted a memorandum 
outlining the circumstances of the interview and attached an 
affidavit from Miller which reiterated his trial testimony and 
denied the allegations (R. 148-52) (Addendum E). 
Defendant did not request an evidentiary hearing and 
the court summarily denied the motion (Supp. Record) (Addendum 
F). 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a 
new trial if a party can establish that "there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect" upon its 
rights. (The rule is reproduced at page 3 of this brief.) 
To justify a new trial, newly discovered 
evidence should clarify a fact that was 
contested and resolved against the movant, or 
be sufficiently persuasive that the result of 
the trial might be changed. Generally, newly 
discovered impeachment evidence does not 
ordinarily warrant a new trial. 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted). A failure to provide discovery or discovery of minor 
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impeachment evidence, without more, are not sufficient 
justifications for a new trial. Id.; State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 
751, 753 (Utah 1984). 
On the other hand, the established use of false 
material testimony constitutes grounds for a new trial. Walker 
v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981). The State's use of false 
evidence corrupts the "truth seeking function of the trial 
process." Id. at 691. "Thus, while [a prosecutor] should 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about 
a just one." Id. (footnote omitted). 
Because the prohibition against the use of false 
testimony is so widely recognized, the trial court's summary 
denial of defendant's new trial motion is consistent only with a 
finding that Miller testified truthfully. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991) (appellate court may presume 
findings whenever it "would be reasonable to assume that the 
[trial] court made such findings"). It is also supported by the 
evidence. 
Defendant's attack on the court's ruling is predicated 
on a false assumption - that a tape or notes exist. As 
previously discussed, Despain testified at trial that he thought 
the interview was recorded (T. 130) . Certainly, this is a 
natural assumption when a witness observes a tape recorder, and 
here, the recorder was on the table. But Despain's assertion in 
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his affidavit that he was asked if the interview could be 
recorded and that it was recorded, are in direct conflict with 
Miller's testimony and affidavit, as well as the prosecutor's 
statements at trial (T. 202, 212-22; R. 151-52). Rather than 
acknowledge this conflict and the trial court's prerogative to 
assess credibility, defendant improperly asserts Despain's 
statement as established fact. It is not. Compare Walker, 624 
P.2d at 690 (trial court specifically found that material 
information was not disclosed which conveyed a false impression 
which the prosecutor knew was false but did not correct), with 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1244 n.41 (trial court's finding that 
witness' testimony was different than earlier testimony did not 
establish that testimony was false or prosecution knew it was 
false). 
The inappropriateness of presenting Despain's 
allegation as established fact is compounded by defendant's 
insupportable accusation that the prosecutor suborned perjury. 
Considering that the same defense counsel asserted at trial that 
the prosecutor never acted inappropriately (T. 292), and no new 
information has come to light, it is difficult to see how this 
accusation can be made in good faith. 
Because defendant failed to present a sufficient basis 




For all these reasons, defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C&U^ day of May, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Case No. 921009088FS 
CAO UNKNOWN / 
COMM. PALACIOS / 
COMES NOW the defendant, DOUGLAS TUELLER, through his/her 
attorney, JAMES A. VALDEZ, and requests the following material be 
provided to him/her as discovery no later than three days prior to 
the calendar call presently set for September 15, 1992• To-wit: 
1. All police reports and investigations concerning the 
above-entitled case; 
2. All written or recorded statements of the defendant and 
co-defendant(s), if any; 
3. The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal 
record including any convictions of any witnesses to be called by 
the prosecution; 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
00022 
6. All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; 
7. All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case. 
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5)(b), the State 
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead 
DATED this gJ day of September, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Defendant ^ r-~ 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request to the Salt Lake 
County Attorneys Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this day of September, 1992 
OEUVERED 3\ 









j MR, VALDEZ: Matt Despain. 
2 THE COURT: Or Matt Despain? 
3 MR. VALDEZ: Matt Despain was a witness 
4 that— 
5 THE COURT: That doesnft have anything 
to do— 
7 I MR. VALDEZ: No, thatfs not who they1re 
8 going to call, but I think their argument will be that they 
9 didn't know whether or not Matt Despain was going to testify 
or not. Matt Despain has always been our witness, although 
for reasons strategic to my case, I seldom call witnesses at 
a preliminary hearing; however, he was interviewed by 
investigating officers, he's mentioned in at least one or 
two of the reports, and I think that the State has had 











In addition to that, I—I see no other reason why they would 
go and interview him. 
Now, we're unclear as to when the State may have 
gone to interview Mr. Despain, and—and people who conducted 
the interview, I think was Mr. Miller and Mr. Lunnen was 
present. That was conducted, I think at least a couple of 
months ago. I've never received any—any information in 
terms of discovery information as to—as to what he may or 
may not testify about, as to whether or not he would be a 
potential witness. And in fact, itfs my recollection, 
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although Mr. Lunnen disagrees is—is that today is the first, 
or yesterday was the first time I found that Ron Miller may 
be a witness in this case. 
I think if he was a potential witness, that the 
State should have provided discovery to "me, they should have 
provided a copy of the—the taped interview, if there was 
one, or they should have provided copies of—of any summary 
reports that—that Mr. Miller may have prepared in preparation 
for this case or in preparation for his eventual— 
THE COURT: W e l l — 
MR. VALDEZ: —testimony. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, we heard 
all this in chambers, and I'm ask—I'm going to ask you a 
couple of questions, Mr. Valdez. 
Tell me where it is—what—what authority you base 
the proposition on that they should have told you about 
interviewing— 
MR. VALDEZ: Brady vs. Maryland— 
THE COURT: — o r excuse me, about 
Mr. Miller b e — 
MR. VALDEZ: Brady vs. Maryland— 
THE COURT: —being a witness? 
MR. VALDEZ: —your Honor, State v. 
Knight is the Utah case. Rule 16 of the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure is the discovery— 
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1 THE COURT: You tell me where in Rule— 
2 you tell me where in Rule 16, it says that they are obli-
3 gated to tell you that they have interviewed somebody who 
4 might be a potential rebuttal witnesses—witness? 
5 MR. VALDEZ: Rule 16—Rule 16 indicates 
6 that they have to give me reports of anybody that may have 
7 incriminating evidence as against my client or exculpatory— 
8 exculpatory evidence concerning my client, and that's— 
9 and that—and that has been verified through case law, 
Brady vs. Maryland and—and the State of Utah vs. Knight— 
or Knight vs—the State of Utah vs. Knight. 
And I—in addition to that, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure those 
cases hold that, because 16 doesn't say that they have to 
give you all statements that they have recorded from anybody, 
MR. VALDEZ: In addition to that, Judge, 
my discovery motion, I think specifically asks for any and 
all witnesses that they may call, and I think it also 
indicates that—including potential rebuttal witnesses that 
they may know of, and that's our standard discovery motion. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, and again, 
you can ask—you can ask whatever you want to in pleadings, 
but if they're not authorised by the law or by the rules, 
they can be ignored, too. 
Okay. All police reports and investigations. Any 
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1 written or recorded statement of the defendant and co-
2 J defendants. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
3 defendant. All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of 
4 the—of the offense for reduced punishment. All physical 
5 evidence taken. All investigative analysis done on any 
6 I evidence in the above-entitled case, that's got to mean not 
7 the work done as a part of the attorney's work record, but 
8 things like lab work and so on, and that's—that's your 
9 request. 
10 MR. VALDEZ: That is. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Now, tell me 
12 where—where Mr. Miller's statement fits into that? 
13 MR. VALDEZt It fits into, any evidence 
14 that may be inculpa—inculpatory— 
15 THE COURT: There isn't— 
16 MR. VALIDEZi — i t says any investigative 
17 reports. 
18 THE COURT t First of all—first of all, 
19 Mr. Valdez, read your—your—your—your request, it doesn't 
20 say that. You keep saying it does. It doesn't. I read it 
21 to you. 
22 MR. VALDEZ: Well, let me tell y o u — 
23 let me, for the record, let me indicate, we're not going to 
24 be able to be specific at that time, because we don't know 
25 the names of the investigators, Judge. 
I 2CK) _ _ _ _ 
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THE COURT: W e l l , t h e n , d o n ' t t e l l roe 
t h a t t h a t ' s what i t s a y s . 
MR. VALDEZ: W e l l , I th ink i t says t h a t 
i n g e n e r a l , and f o r — 
THE COURT: I t d o e s n ' t . 
MR. VALDEZ: —and for the record, I 
would submit it on that. 
THE COURT: It doesn't even use the 
word "inculpatory". It uses the word "negation", "negate" 
or to mit—to mean to mitigate. It doesn't say they have 
to tell you anything about inculpatory except police 
reports and investigations. 
MR. VALDEZ: Any and all police reports 
and investigations. 
THE COURT: All police reports and 
investigations. All police reports and investigations. 
That is—doesn't mean you can get anything the attorneys do. 
MR. VALDEZ: Well— 
THE COURT: Any—any more— 
MR. VALDEZ: —Judge—Judge, I'm not 
going to back down from my position. I—you know, 1*11 
submit it, you rule on it; but I think when I ask for all 
investigations, that's exactly what it means. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't. 
MR. VALDEZ: Is all investigations, 
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j inculpatory or exculpatory* 
2 THE COURT: Well— 
3 MR. LUNNEN: And before you make a ruling, 
4 can I just for the record, make a few representations to the 
5 Court? 
6 THE COURT: Yeah. 
7 MR. LUNNEN: First of all, just to—to 
8 J factually clarify how Mr. Miller got involved in this case, 
and I wish I could give you a specific date, perhaps if we 
put Mr. Miller on, we can ask him when—if he remembers the 
date of the interview. 
I requested, either prior to the preliminary 
hearing or prior to the first setting of this trial, that 
Mr. Miller accompany me to do a pretrial interview or a pre-
hearing interview, 'cause I had never talked to Matt 
Despain, and in order to avoid the issue of me becoming a 
witness in the case, I asked Mr. Miller to come with me, 
that he would ask the questions and I would take notes. And 
I did take personal notes, which I do consider work product, 
and that I did not feel an obligation to provide, nor does 
Rule 16 require me to provide those notes to the defendant. 
Mr. Miller did not tape record his interview, and 
he will represent that on the stand, nor did he take notes. 
I was the only person that took notes. There was no Brady 
material generated from this interview, it was a pretrial 
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interview, so in that light, there was nothing under Brady 
that I was required to provide to the defendant, or that I 
felt wasorequired to be provided to the defendant. 
And—and my recollection is that—and I don't know 
when, either, and I wish that I could tell you, that I did 
tell defense counsel that Mr. Miller h»d interviewed Matt 
Despain. 
I will state that Ron Miller is not on our witness 
list, and the reason why he's not on our witness list is, I 
did not intend on calling him to testify unless Matt Despain 
was called by the defense. 
Now, during the preliminary hearing, he was not 
called or subpoenaed by the defendant. I asked Mr. Despain 
to come for the prelim and then 1 ended up not calling him. 
Then I subpoenaed him three times, all time—every time this 
trial vas set, I subpoenaed him and he was not subpoenaed by 
the defendant, for this trial or any of the previous setting. 
And— 
MR. VALDEZ: Well— 
MR. iUNNEN: — I had no indication at 
least—other than there was a handwritten list that was 
handed to Mr. Castle some time back that indicated that Matt 
Despain was a witness on their list! but other than that, I 
had no knowledge that he was going to be called, even for 
this—this setting. I subpoenaed. And when I didn't call 
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him, then they did call him to the stand, and at—it was at 
. that time that I decided, and I did let him know prior to 
this trial, that it was a possibility that Ron Miller could be 
called on rebuttal, this was yesterday! and even at that 
point, I didn't know that he would, because Matt Despain had 
6 J not taken the stand at that time. I donlt see anything in 
7 Rule 16 that requires disclosure, and I have nothing to 
8 disclose, there were no notes, no recordings. Thank you, 
THE COURT; Well, I—I agree. 1 donlt 
think Rule 16 requires xt unless the cases to which Mr. Valdez 
has reference do, I don"t think they do, but whether I'm 
right or wrong, I guess the whole reason for the brouhaha 
is that you want his testimony excluded, and it will not be. 
MR. LUNNEN: And one more matter for 
clarification, I do see on my notes that Matt Despain was 
interviewed on October 17th, 1992, at 6il5, that was one day 
prior to the preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LUNNEN: That was the evening before 
the prelim. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, does the defense 
have further witnesses? 
MR, VALDEZt We have no further witnesses, 
Judge, we would rest. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may call any 
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present something to the Court on the record? 
MR, VALDEZ: Before we broke for recess, 
just before the lunch hour, Judge, the State had indicated 
that they had intended to call four rebuttal witnesses. 
Among those witnesses, I think three of them of which I've 
received reports about, there's one other witness that—that 
I don't recall is on their latest list or not, but that was 
Ron Miller. 
Ron Miller apparently interviewed, or was present 
at an interview with Matt Despain and Matt Despain, as you 
recall, had indicated on the stand that—that he thought 
that that interview was recorded. There's a dispute about 
that at this point in time. 
It's my position, Judge, that when I asked for 
discovery, I received reports concerning all the other 
witnesses that the State has called and the other witnesses 
that they intend to call, including the three rebuttal 
witnesses that they intend to call. I've never received 
any reports, any summaries, any notes, anything concerning 
the interview that may have been conducted by Ron Miller with 
Matt Despain. 
Matt Despain has been a witness of mine throughout. 
First of all, if you'll look at the police reports, you can 
see that Matt Despain— 
THE COURT: This Ron Despain? 
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Q I guess for—for resale, or even for your own 
purposes, isn't that true? 
A Right. We're not allowed to purchase tickets at all 
Q Okay. And I guess that's so that they can avoid 
possible problems? 
A Uh huh. 
MR. VALDEZ: That's all I have. 
MR. CASTLE: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
May this witness be excused? 
MR. VALDEZ: No objection, 
MR. CASTLE: She may, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may be excused. You need 
not remain. If you wish to, you may, however. 
MR. CASTLE: The State's next witness, 
your Honor, is Ron Miller. 
THE COURT: Ron Miller to the stand. 
Mr. Miller, come forward and be sworn, please. 
RONALD E. MILLER, 
called as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the State 
in this matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed 
the witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Please take the stand. 
State your name, please. 
211 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)286-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
a i THE WTTNESS: Ronald E. Miller. 
2 , M-i-3-l-e-r. 
3 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LUNNEN: 
6 Q Mr. Miller, would you tell the jury how you're 
- currently employed? 
g A I'm a criminal investigator for the Utah State 
a I Attorney General's Office. 
Q And would you tell them a little bit about your 
.. I background and experience? 
A I have approximately 27 years as a law enforcement 
officer. I was a Salt Lake City Police Officer for four 
years, a Utah State Narcotics officer for four years, I 
was a special— 
MR. VALDEZ: We'll accept the qualifica-
tions of Mr. Miller as an investigator for the Attorney 
General's Office. 
MR. LUNNEN: Okay. Thank you. 
THE roURT: Ladies and gentlemen, again, 
that means that the qualifications of this officer to testify 
as a officer, as he's testified he is, have been agreed upon. 
You need not seek further proof in that regard. 
Go ahead. 
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you to accompany me to a pretrial interview in approximately 
October of f 92? 
A Yes, sir* I do* 
Q And do you recall who that individual was that was 
interviewed? 
A It was a witness by the name of Matt Despain. 
Q And where was that interview done? 
A At his residence* 
Q And did you ask the questions, yourself? 
A Yes, sir. I conducted the interview and asked 
the direct questions of Mr* Despain* 
Q And this was done in his home? 
A In his residence, yes, sir* 
Q Did you take any notes, yourself, of the interview? 
A No, sir* It was a pretrial interview. I was doing 
the questioning, but I did not keep any notes as the 
investigation was already complete. 
Q Did you make any recording of the interview? 
A No, sir. I did not. 
Q What was the nature of—of your interview, in 
general? 
A Kcll, I was questioning Mr. Despain of his obser— 
observations on an incident that I had reviewed a police 
report on that had mentioned his name as a witness, and so I 
interviewed him regarding his observations and his personal 
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involvement in that particular: incident, 
Q All right. Do you recall asking Mr, Despain if— 
MR, V&LDEZ-t I would object to the 
leading nature of the questions. 
THE COURT: Yeah, itfs going to be a 
6 1 leading question, sure as daylight. Sustained. 
7 Well, yeah, it does. It would be. Go ahead. 
8 Q (By Mr. Lunnen) Mr. Miller, what did you ask 
9 Mr. Despain about, of the evening of June 6th? 
A I asked him about his involvement in an incident 
that had occurred some time prior to that, I think it was 
approximately June or July of 1992. I asked him if he had 
met, I think the gentleman's name of Mr. Tueller, and what 
his association was with Mr. Tueller on that particular 
afternoon and evening, and what he—the conversations he 
had with Mr. Tueller, his observations during a trip to the 
Delta Center in Salt Lake on Third West, his activities at 
that particular location, what he observed. 
Q All right. Did you ask him about his relationship 
with Mr. Tueller? 
A Yes, sir. I went into the relationship. I 
actually asked him what he did that day and he gave me a 
narrative. He had met Mr. Tueller that afternoon, 
Mr. Tueller had come down and asked him if he wanted to go 
play softball. He accompanied Mr. Tueller to play softball. 
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1 I asked him what happened at that point. Mr. Despain 
2 indicated that when they got out in Mr. Tueller1s car, 
3 Mr. Tueller indicated he had to go to the Delta Center and 
4 buy some tickets. 
5 Enroute to the Delta Center, I believe it was 
6 tickets to a—well, it was a country and western singer, 
7 I'm not—the name escapes me at the moment; but enroute 
8 there, Mr. Tueller asked him to borrow—if Mr. Despain would 
9 lend Mr. Tueller $50. Mr, Tueller—or Mr. Despain said he 
10 would, and loaned him $50. 
11 Q What questions, if any, did you ask him about this 
12 $5 0 loan that he made to Mr. Tueller, to the defendant? 
13 A I asked him the denomination of the bills and I 
14 asked him what he did with the money after he gave it to him. 
15 Q Did he tell you what the denominations of the bills 
16 were that h*> gave the defendant? 
17 A Yes, sir. He did. 
18 Q And what was that? 
19 A He indicated that he couldn't remember the exact 
20 denominations, but it was tens and twenties, amounted to $50. 
21 Q All right. Did you question him as to whether or 
22 not he could have given him any other amount of money? Any 
23 other amount of denomination? 
24 MR. VALDE&: Your Honor, thatfs leading. 
25 Ifm going to object• 
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1 THE COURT: I'll allow it. Go ahead. 
2 THE WITNESS: Well, I asked him if it was 
3 other—another denomination, obviously, if it was a $50 bill. 
4 And he had indicated it was tens and twenties. He didn't 
5 know what combination of tens and twenties, just tens and 
6 twenties. 
7 MR. LUNNEN: I have no other questions, 
8 your Honor. Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: You may cross. 
10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. VALDE2: 
12 Q You—you say you didn't record that statement? 
13 A No, sir. As 1 recollect, there was no recording. 
14 Q And you accompanied Mr. Lunnen down there, did 
15 you not? Mr. Lunnen here? 
16 A Yes. I did. 
17 Q And Mr. Lunnen was the one taking notes, I take it? 
18 A He was keeping notes , yes, sir. 
19 Q You didn't take any notes whatsoever? 
20 A I had a pad with me, I jotted—I was doodling, 
21 primarily. I was concentrating on the sequence of the 
22
 questioning and the police report. 
23 Q And that was back in October? 
24 A Excuse me, sir, 
25 Q Back in October? 
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1 A Yes, sir. It was in October, 1992. 
2 Q You're sure it was in October? 
3 A That's the time, as I recollect* I keep a diary and 
4 I put down the time and place o f — 
5 Q What about the date? What date in October, do 
6 you remember? 
7 A I couldn't tell you that, sir, without consulting 
8 my diary. 
9 Q And so you consulted your diary today, or in the 
10 last couple of days? 
11 A No, sir. I have not. 
12 Q You haven't consulted your diary at all? 
13 A Well, I fill it out daily. I did not consult it 
14 on that date. 
15 Q Concerning this case, have you consulted y o u r — 
16 your diary? 
17 A No, sir. I have not. 
18 Q Okay. And have you consulted the notes of anybody 
19 else, including the notes of Mr. Lunnen? 
20 A I reviewed the case with Mr. Lunnen. We went over 
21 the case and went over the conversation we had, or I had 
22 with Mr. Despain. 
23 Q So you discussed—you discussed the conversation 
24 or the interview that you had, with Mr. Lunnen when? Today? 
25 Yesterday? 
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A I believe yesterday, Mr. Lunnen indicated— 
Q Well, that's a—was it today or yesterday, is what 
I'm asking. 
A Yesterday and today, sir. 
Q Okay. So apparently he was looking at his notes 
also; is that correct? 
A I don't know, sir. I would imagine he had his 
notes, he had the case file. 
Q So you're not testifying totally from memory, are 
you? 
A I'm testifying from memory, as we recollected the 
interview after he pretried me. 
Q Isn't—isn't the most accurate way to record a 
statement is to just simply record it, with an electronic 
device? 
A Yes, sir. It is. 
Q And that's because what you get is, you get 
exactly what is being said; isn't that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you don't iiave to rely on memory later, you 
can transcribe that, and you can testify pretty directly as 
tc what was said? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q In fact, exactly what was said? 
A Yes, sir. 
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1 Q You chose not to do that on this occasion? 
2 A Yes, sir. I chose not to use an oral tape 
3 recording. 
4 Q Okay. Mr. Despain indicated that he thought you 
5 had a recorder there, was he mistaken? 
6 I A In my recollection, he is, sir. I may have taken a 
7 recorder, but I didn't record the conversation. 
8 I Q So you think you may have taken a recorder? 
9 I A I may have. Generally when I go on an interview, 
10 I will take a recorder. 
11 Q In fact, that's generally good practice, isn't it? 
12 To take a recorder? 
13 A It all depends on the situation, the interviews, 
14 the allegations involved, whether the person's a witness, a 
15 suspect or simply a — a n important witness or a periphery 
16 witness. 
17 Q Well, what was Mr. Despain at that time? 
18 A Actually, as far as the investigation went, he was 
19 merely being pretried by Mr. Lunnen. I was not conducting 
20 the investigation. 
2i Q But you were asking the questions? 
22 A Yes, sir. 
23 Q Okay. And you took along--you may have taken along 
24 a recorder, although it wasn't used? 
25 I MR. LUNNEN: That's been asked and 
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answered, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It has. 
Q (By Mr. Valdez) It's your testimony that no 
recorder was used, although there may have been one there? 
A I did not tape record— 
MR. LUNNEN: That's been asked and 
answered— 
THE WITNESS: —the conversation, sir. 
MR. LUNNEN: — a s well. 
THE COURT: Yeah, it has. 
Q (By Mr. Valdez) Now, let me ask you this: Did 
Mr. Despain ask you not to record the conversation? Do you 
recall? 
A I don't recall that, sir. 
Q And do you recall if you told Mr. Despain, I'm not 
going to record this conversation, or anything to that 
effect. 
A I don't think that issue was specifically addressed 
by me, sir. 
Q Do you—well, you don't think; do you recall if it 
was? 
A I don't recall that that issue was specifically 
addressed by— 
Q Do you recall whether or not you told Mr. Despain 
anything about the recorder at all? 
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A Well, to be actually frank with you, I don't 
recall discussing a tape recorder. 
Q Okay. And—but you don't recall if there was a 
tape recorder there or not? 
A I—as I say, as a matter of course, when I go on 
an interview, I will usually take a tape recorder just as 
7 I simply a back-up. I did not intend to record that 
8 | particular .conversation because of the nature of the interview 
Q Was that so that you couldn't be held to what was 
said? 
A No, sir. Absolutely not. 
Q And did you ask questions that—that you thought of, 
or were they questions that Mr. Lunnen wanted you to ask? 
A They were my questions. I'd reviewed the file, 
including the police reports, witness statements that were 
already in that particular file, antf I had jotted down 
questions and reviewed that, and I conducted the question— 
I prefer to conduct the .questioning, myself, using my 
general chain of questioning for better development of the 
answers and the questions. 
Q Let me ask you this: Did—did you specifically jot 
down in your diary or any notes that you have in your 
possession, tens and twenties? 
A No, sir. I did not. 
Q So you're testifying from memory in that regard 
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1 then; is that correct? 
2 A Yes, sir. 
3 Q As far as you know, that's not written down, 
4 anywhere? 
5 A I believe it's written down, it has been written 
6 down by roe. 
7 Q If Mr. Despain was under the impression that his 
8 statement was recorded, apparently he's mistaken then; is 
9 that right? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q But it—but it's not in—it's not that there may 
12 not have been a recorder there, 'cause there may have been? 
!3 A There could possibly have been a recorder there. 
14 As I say, in many interviews I go out with, I will take a 
15 recorder. Actually, it's in my briefcase all the time. 
16 Q Now, you also indicated—I take it--were you 
17 designated some sort of investigator in this? 
18 A No, sir. 
19 Q Okay. You just accompanied Mr. Lunnen then? 
20 A Just accompanied Mr. Lunnen to conduct the interview 
21 of the witness prior to trial. 
22 Q Before you did that, you read some police reports 
23 then, is that—isn't that correct? 
24 A I reviewed the file that Mr. Lunnen had, yes, sir. 
25 Q And there is no question in your mind that 
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2 Mr. Despain may have been a witness? 
2 A He was a witness, to my knowledge. 
3 Q All right. 
4 MR. VALDEZ: Thatfs all I have. 
5 THE COURT: Anything further? 
6 I MR. LUNNEN: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: You may step down. 
8 May this witness be excused? 
9 MR. VALDEZ: No objection. 
10 MR. LUNNENr No objection. 
U THE COURT: You may be excused, sir. 
12 You need not remain. 
13 MR. LUNNEN: The next witness the State 
14 will call, your Honor, is Kent Bigelow. 
15 THE COURT: Kent Bigelow, please. 
16 Mr. Bigelow, come forward and be sworn, sir. 
17 KENT BIGELOW, 
18 called as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the State 
19 in this matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed 
20 the witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
21 THE COURTi Please take the stand. 
22 Please state your name and spell your last. 
23 THE WITNESS: My name is Kent Bigelow, 
24 B-i-g-e-1-o-w. 
25 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
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-MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901548FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Defendant by and through his attorney of record, JAMES 
A. VALDEZ, moves the Court for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
24(a) Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure in the interest of 
justice on the grounds that because of error or impropriety 
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of 
defendant, Douglas Tueller. 
Specifically they are: 
(1) States failure to disclose through discovery 
evidence that the state intended to produce regarding 
statements taken from Mathew Despain by state investigator, Ron 
Miller, including recorded statements and reports thereto; 
(2) The state through its representatives or agents 
allowed false testimony by Ron Miller that there was no 
recording of his conversation with Mathew Despain and Ann 
00153 
Despain. Further, that no notes were taken. 
The states representatives were fully aware of such a 
recording and notes yet allowed Investigator Miller to testify 
that there were none. 
(3) None of Mr. Tueller's expunged records should 
have been used or considered in rendering a sentence for the 
reasons that there was a failure to comply with §77-18-2(4) 
Utah Code Ann. as amended in 1992 nor was there ever a Judicial 
Order pursuant to §77-18-2(5)(c)(1). 
Affidavits to follow. 
DATED this day of May, 1993. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office 
of the County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this day of May, 1993. 
DELIVERED » \ 
MAY 2*< _ 
D&TA0AMR<> 
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JAMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901548FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
I, MATTHEW DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law 
on my oath depose and say: 
Regarding the interview that took place on or about October 
17, 1992 between myself, Ron Miller, and Rob Lunnen. I was 
interviewed about a case concerning Douglas Tueller. The interview 
lasted about 20 minutes. I was asked in the beginning if they could 
record the interview, at which time they started a tape recorder. 
They also took extensive notes to which my wife was a witness. 
DATED this <3 day of June, 1993. 
1993. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this 
r—i - r .b ! - -
T'.VID LOYOLA 
iU^So Yuma 
Salt Late City, L'ta>«lC 
«r <TS day of June, 
I 
I — - - -NOTflKr-pUBLTC / 
My Commission Expires: 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah 84114, 
this day of June, 1993. 
C0I33 
JAMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901548FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
I, ANN DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law on 
my oath depose and say: 
Witnessed the interview that took place on or about October 
17, 1992 between my husband, Matthew Despain, Ron Miller, and Rob 
Lunnen. The interview was concerning Douglas Tueller. The 
interview lasted about 20 minutes. My husband was asked in the 
beginning if they could record the interview, at which time they 
started a tape recorder. They also took extensive notes. 
DATED this ? — day of June, 1993. 
ANN DESPAIN ~ i 
1993. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this o — day of June, 
L'c^ry Public { 
DAVID LOYOLA I 
My Commission Expires: 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah 84114, 
this day of June, 1993. 
ADDENDUM E 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
ROBERT C. LUNNEN (4620) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
:r.s!-j Jtrciiclal District 
JUN 1 7 1993 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL 
Criminal No. 921901548FS 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
TO 
The State of Utah by and through Robert C. Lunnen, 
Assistant Attorney General responds to Defendant's motion for a new 
trial and represents the following in support thereof: 
1. The State provided complete and accurate discovery to 
defendant. The interview conducted by Ron Miller and Robert Lunnen 
was a pre-trial interview necessary for the preparation of Matthew 
Despain's testimony at the preliminary hearing. Although Mr. 
Miller was in possession of a tape recorder during Mr. Despain's 
interview, no tape recording was made of Mr. Despain's statements. 
Mr. Miller truthfully testified that he took no notes during the 
interview. The handwritten notes taken by the prosecution during 
this interview are not discoverable. (See Affidavit of Ronald 
Miller attached hereto.) 
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2. The Defendant's expunged records were not used nor 
considered by the court to determine defendant's sentence. Records 
of the Defendant's expunged convictions were not disclosed to nor 
examined by the State. The State's only knowledge of expunged 
records are from defense counsel's oral request that the state not 
use expunged convictions for impeachment purposes. The State never 
attempted to impeach Defendant's testimony by evidence of prior 
convictions. 
The State respectfully represents that Defendant's motion 
for a new trial is without merit and should be dismissed. 




Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Enforcement Division 
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JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
ROBERT C. LUNNEN (4620) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Ronald E. Miller, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and state as follow: 
1. I am a criminal investigator for the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, and have been so employed since 1982. 
2. I assisted Assistant Attorney General Rob Lunnen 
in a pre-trial interview of Matthew Despain on October 16, 1992, 
at approximately 6pm. I was not the case agent nor involved in 
the investigation. Mr. Lunnen asked that I accompany him as a 
witness for his preparation for a preliminary hearing. 
3. The interview as conducted at the residence of 
Matthew Despain, and Mr. Lunnen asked that I conduct the 
interview while he took notes. I had a tape recorder with me, 
and the tape recorder was on the table. To the best of my 
recollection I did not tape the interview. 
4. I testified at Douglas Tueller's trial that I had 
a tape recorder with me during the interview, but that I did not 
recall tape recording the interview. 
f; 'J U i 
5. I have since conducted a review of the tape 
recordings in my possession from past investigations, and have 
not located any tape recording of the Despain interview. 
DATED this day of Zfu f^€— , 1993. 
RONALD E. MILLER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this /5^4dav of QU*JU 1993 
NOTARY PUBLIC V 
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ADDENDUM F 
/AMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Third Judicial £'.-..:• 
NOV 3 0 1993 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL'DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
-v-
DOUGLAS J. TUELLER, 
Defendant, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901548FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
BASED UPON Motion of defendant and good cause appearing 
therefore;: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for New Trial 
is denied in the above-entitled-matter. 
DATED this the day of November, 1993. 
BY TEE" Cpl 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this ______ day of November, 1993. 
OSLSV52-55 BY 
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